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Abstract 
Informal credit markets are very active in many developing countries including China. 
Informal financial associations have become a major channel of borrowing. Using data from the 
2006 Rural Household Survey, this paper investigates farmers‟ borrowings from both formal and 
informal sources with higher/lower interest, by looking into both demand and supply of loan. 
Consistent with the theory and previous studies, age follows an inverted U-shaped pattern in 
its relationship with the probability of borrowing from informal loan with higher interest. Our 
study shows that the impact of age disappears for the formal loan participation. In addition, 
high income and saving imply lower credit constraints. Moreover, household and county 
characteristics and financial conditions have a large and varying influence on farmers‟ borrowing 






























Farmers’ Choice and Informal Credit Markets in China 
 
Informal credit markets are very active in many developing countries including China. Although 
Chinese government has made efforts in developing the formal financial markets in rural areas, 
still, borrowing from informal channels reached up to 60% among farmers. Informal financial 
associations have become a major channel of borrowing, together with formal financial 
institutions.  
Why farmers choose informal financial associations more than formal financial institutions? 
Some authors argue that it is due to the information asymmetry between formal financial 
institutions and farmers (Bell, Srinivasan and Udry 1997; Conning 1996; Hof and Stiglitz 1990). 
Farmers who need loans may have difficulties obtaining collateral or a guarantor, a requirement 
at formal financial institutions; therefore, they may not be able to borrow or may not borrow 
enough funds from these formal institutions. As a result, they have no choice but to turn to 
informal credit markets. Others think that high interest cost is an important factor affecting 
farmers‟ choice (Guirkinger 2008)of loan. Borrowings from relatives and friends, which is a 
much larger proportion of informal loans in rural China, may have lower or even zero interest 
rates (He 1999; Li and Li 2004). In addition, informal loans do not generally require written loan 
agreements and are more flexible in borrowing terms, therefore are lower in transaction costs 
(Wang 2005). Still others contended from the supply side, arguing that choices might be affected 
by risks to repay the loan. Lenders of informal loans tend to have more information on borrowers, 
for example, changes in their income, assets and consumptions, which enables the lender adjust 
loan terms accordingly to reduce default risks (Guirkinger 2008). Therefore, the objectives of the 
paper are two folds: 1) to explore farmers‟ participation in the formal credit market; 2) to 
empirically identify the determinants of informal credits used by farmers.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief introduction of 
background of microfinance in China. Section 3 describes the model and relevant variables 
are discussed in section 4. Data are then described in the following section. Section 5 presents 
the estimation methodology and the last section discuss results and concludes the paper.   4 
 
Microfinance in China 
Shortly after 1949, all forms of private finance were banned including pawn brokering and 
„„loan sharking‟‟ (Hsiao 1971; Tsai 2004). During the 1950s, China set up a network of rural 
credit cooperatives (RCCs), which acted mainly as fiscal institutions that funneled credit 
between the state and the people‟s communes (Tsai 2004). Together with the re-established 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), RCCs started to function more as commercial banking 
institutions for financing in rural areas after the reforms in the late 1970s. RCCs became the 
only formally approved nonbanking financial institution, after the elimination of Rural 
Cooperative Foundations at the end of 1990s, to serve rural enterprises and households (Tsai 
2004). Since then, central banking authorities injected approximately US$4 billion in 
recapitalization funds into the RCC system. As of mid-2003, RCCs accounted for 11.5% of 
total savings and 10.8% of loans extended by formal financial institutions, and a pilot reform 
scheme for decentralizing their management was underway in eight provinces (PD, 
November 30, 2003). 
Chinese government did not provide subsidized loans directly to households until after 
the introduction of China‟s National 8–7 Poverty Alleviation Plan in 1993. As part of the 
strategy to raise 80 million people out of poverty in seven years (i.e., during 1994–2000), the 
central government identified 592 poor counties where households would be directly targeted 
for subsidized poverty loans. In 1996 many counties adopted the Grameen Bank model of 
group lending whereby groups of five borrowers would mutually guarantee the repayment of 
their respective microloans in multiple installments (Bornstein, 1997; Holcombe, 1995; 
Khandker, Khalily, & Khan, 1995). These loans ranged from 1,000 to 2,000 RMB 
(US$120–240) and they continued to be subsidized at the official PA lending rate of 2.88%. 
By 2000, the government had disbursed US$775 million worth of subsidized microloans 
(Tsien, 2001), and by 2002 nearly US$3.7 billion of the central government poverty-relief 
funds were going toward poverty-relief loans (Xinhua, March 2, 2002). As in the earlier 5 
 
model of poverty lending, however, repayment rates in these government programs have been 
less than 60%. Meanwhile, the People's Bank of China (PBC) has been encouraging RCCs to 
extend microloans to rural households. As of 2002, the PBC reported that RCCs had extended 
a total of 78.9 billion RMB (US$9.54 billion) worth of microloans and that 25% of all rural 
households in the country had received such loans (CIIC, November 5, 2002).   
Major forms of informal credit in rural China includes rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCA, or hui in Chinese).    ROSCA involve relatively small groups of 
people, 5 to 10 members on average. Rural households pool monthly contributions and rotate 
the disbursal of the collective pot of money to each member (Tsai 2004).    Other forms of 
informal finance exist in the names of mutual assistance societies (huzhuhui in Chinese) and 
cooperative savings foundations. These nongovernmental financial institutions have managed 
to operate above ground and serve private businesses by registering as social organizations. 
Model 
We set up estimation models that take into account the multistage decision process of 
household credit demand. First, we estimate separately the outcome of two decision processes: 
(i) the probability of borrowing bank loans, or formal credit market participation; and (ii) the 
probability of borrowing higher interest informal loans versus borrowing from relatives and 
friends. Then, we introduce the equations for the two decision process which are based on the 
“latent” demand and supply functions: 
  D DX       (1) 
  S SZ       (2) 
A household‟s desired stock of debt depends on a set of explanatory variables, X, and 
can be represented by the latent demand function D. D is an unobservable or latent 
continuous random variable. X is a vector of variables that determines whether a person 
would desire to hold positive debt, and  D  is a random error term. On the supply side, 6 
 
although a household may want positive debt, she is subject to the lender‟s evaluation.  S is 
an unobservable continuous random variable.  Z is a vector of variables that affect the 
lender‟s decision to grant a loan or not and  S  is a random error term. 
We are only able to observe whether households have positive borrowings from the 
survey. We define variable and identify  1 1 d  if a household borrowed from banks and 
1 0 d    if not. We exclude households who do not have any need in borrowing. We estimate 
a logit model with  1 d as a dependent variable. Second, we identify  2 1 d  if a household 
borrowed informal credits with non-zero interest and  2 0 d    if borrowing from relatives and 
friends with zero interest. We then fit a logit model to identify the determinants of the 
borrowing of informal credits. 
Explanatory Variables 
In this section we discuss the relevant variables in our models. On the demand side of credit 
market, age is one of the most important factors suggested by life-cycle theory. Young 
households and individuals are likely to have a high demand for debt because of their 
expectations for higher income and consumption in the future compared with their current 
low income levels. As their age increases, their income becomes higher which make them 
less likely to borrow; therefore, the relationship between the probability of borrowing and age 
is expected to have an inverted U shape according to the theory. The lenders, on the other 
hand, are likely to favor older borrowers as their ability to repay is higher. However, it has 
been found in literatures that in China age has a U-shape, the increasing portion is due to the 
increase in housing demand when young adults reach their marriage age. In order to capture 
this nonlinear relationship, we use both linear and quadratic terms of age as independent 
variables. 
Income is another important factor. From the lender‟s point of view, not only determines 7 
 
the repayment possibilities income but also expected income. In order to capture the effects 
of expected income, we use two sets of variables. The first one is educational dummies to 
proxy the expected income profile, following our assumption that the probability of obtaining 
a loan will be higher for individuals with higher education levels. Our educational dummies 
represent individuals who have finished at the elementary, secondary, high school, and some 
college. The other is sources of income, i.e., income from agriculture, non-agriculture, wage 
and others. It is expected that lenders would prefer lower income volatility which implies 
default risk. 
The relationship between current income and debt is, however, not certain. Normally, 
the higher the current income, the smaller the amount of loan demanded. However, the 
amount of debt demanded may become larger as current income increases, especially if the 
increase is triggered by a permanent income shock. Therefore we use both the current income 
and savings in order to capture the relationship. 
Other socioeconomic variables that are thought to affect debt supply and demand 
include family size, gender, and labor market status. Individuals in a large family are more 
likely to borrow as a large family is more likely to have a higher dependency ratio. To 
capture the effect of gender, the percentage of males in the household is included in the 
analysis. On labor market status, we use the percentage of people migrating to work outside 
as a proxy.    Migrant workers may be more likely to demand loans and less likely to be 
rejected by the lenders.   
We include variables for population density, rural population percentage and banking 
environment situations in counties because the economic development level in the residence 
area may also affect both the demand and supply of credits. The poverty rate is higher in 
general in the rural area and the more dense people live, credit rationing may be more severe 
given constant supply. In areas of better developed environment where banks have affluent 
funds, lenders may be more inclined to supply credits.   8 
 
Data 
The data used for this analysis were obtained from the 2006 Rural Household Survey 
conducted by People‟s Bank of China. The survey was designed to examine credit situation 
and financial demands by farmers in rural China. It initially contained data for 20,040 
households covering 263 counties in 10 provinces. The 10 provinces covered are Jiangsu, 
Fujian, Jilin, Anhui, Henan, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Guizhou and Ningxia. The 
survey contains information on loan situation in addition to household demographics, saving 
and income information. County-level characteristics are obtained from Social and Economic 
Indices Yearbook by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSBC). After excluding 
observations with missing values for our explanatory variables, a sample of 19,079 remained 
for analysis. 
Table 1 describes the definitions and sample statistics of all variables. About 87% of the 
sample (or 15,454 households) reported that they are in need of borrowings in their life for 
agricultural production, which we used as our sample to study the choice of bank loans and 
informal credit by farmers. Among these households, 18% received loans from banks in 2006 
and 7,609 households reported borrowing from informal sectors during the year. The first 
dependent variable formal is defined as equal to 1 if borrowing from banks. The second 
dependent variable informal is defined as equal to 1 if borrowing at non-zero interest in the 
informal sector and defined as equal to 0 if borrowing in the informal sector without paying 
any interest.   
A typical household in our sample has 4 people, 53% male, 19% students and averaged 
at 39 years old. Total household income in 2006 is around 20,630 RMB.    About 65% of the 
sample obtains their income from agricultural activities, 8% from non-agriculture, 25% from 
wages and the rest 2% other sources. About 11% of the sample attended elementary school, 
52% did not finish junior high school, 32% have a high school degree, and the rest (5%) have 
some college or more. 29% households have credit line granted by RCCs. 52% of the 9 
 
households have savings and their desired amount of borrowing is averaged at 2,674RMB 
given the current rate and other conditions, for example, collaterals and guarantors.   
As for the borrowing preferences, 37% of the households report that they prefer to 
borrow from banks and the rest prefer to borrow from informal sectors, either at zero or 
higher interest rates. 29% are willing to take higher interest of borrowing in time of 
emergency and 65% are willing to do the same if they are able to get more borrowings.   
As for the county level information, population density is about 102.37 households per 
square meters, the ratio of loan to savings is about 1.27 and the rural population is around 
74% of the total population on average.     
Results 
Table 2 shows the results of logit estimations on the probability of formal credit market 
participation and the corresponding marginal effects. Table 3 shows the results on the 
probability of borrowing from higher interest informal credit versus borrowing from relatives 
and friends at zero or very low interest. 
The probability of formal credit market participation is a concave function of age, but 
the coefficients for age and age-squared are not significant at 10% confidence level.   
However, age has an inverted U-shape when farmers choose informal credit with higher 
interest rate following the life-cycle hypothesis. It is estimated that the threshold age in our 
sample is around 38, beyond which the probability declines with the increase in age. The 
inverted U-shape could be driven by the supply side as lenders in the informal credit market 
might prefer to grant loans to middle-aged individuals because these people generally have 
more stable income streams, which leads to lower default risk.   
As expected, income has a significant positive effect on the borrowing of bank loans. 
When people have savings and even if current income is lower, individuals tend to borrow 
less. Although we expect that the relationship between education level and credit market 10 
 
participation will be positive, our results show that the relationship is not significant.   
None of the coefficients of education variables are significant in both formal and 
informal credit market participation.    One possible explanation is that lenders may not think 
education level as an indicator for permanent income and, therefore, may not include it in 
their decision factors. The second possible explanation is that, although educated individuals 
have higher permanent income, they also request much more debt than individuals with lower 
education.   
Family size does not seem to have a significant effect on the borrowings from both 
credit markets. Larger family size implies higher credit needs, however, it may due to the fact 
that they are more likely to be frugal so that we do not observe excessive borrowing from 
larger families.     
Males and females do not significantly differ in their probability of participation. The 
probability of credit market participation does not differ significantly for both migrant and 
non-migrant    workers. It may due to the fact that the remittances, income from migrant 
workers, are already included in the total income variable. 
Sources of income seem to play an important role in determining the demand for formal 
and informal credits. For households whose income are mainly from wages, they tend to 
borrow less in both markets, which corresponds to their less need of loans for consumption 
smoothing from an unexpected shock due to their relatively stable income. For households 
whose main incomes are from non-agriculture, or business activities, their demand for 
informal borrowings tend to be higher than households with incomes mainly from agriculture. 
This is not unusual because households who rely on business revenues need to borrow more 
from the informal market with higher interest in order to finance their business activities. The 
amount that these households borrow might be    significantly large so that it may not be 
available for borrowings from relatives and friends.   11 
 
County-level characteristics are significant in both formal and informal credit markets. 
The less populated the county is    the less the rural population and consequently the more 
borrowing from bank loans. In addition, better banking environment promotes    borrowing 
from bank loans. More populated in rural and total population may denote how severe credit 
rationing might be given the limited supply and a bettering banking environment. This may 
help relieve the tightness of the situation. However, total population density and rural 
population do not seem to explain why farmers choose higher-interest credits in the informal 
credit markets.   
Conclusions 
This paper examines the determinants of farmers‟ credit market participation in formal and 
informal credit markets in China in 2006. The data show that about 86% of rural households 
are in debts, among which 40% obtained their loans from informal markets and 16% from 
banks. Our models corrected for selection bias are used to investigate the determinants.   
The empirical results on the determinants of credit demands help shed light on lending 
criteria or the factors underlying the credit-scoring model. Consistent with the theory and 
previous studies, our research shows that the relationship between the probability of credit 
market participation and age follows an inverted U-shaped pattern. As expected, high income 
and saving imply lower constraints. Education variables are found to have no significant 
effect on the borrowings. County institutional settings have significant effects on the demand 
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Table 1  Sample Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
households in need of borrowings    0.81    0.395   
households borrowing from banks  0.18    0.388   
households participating in informal sector  0.15    0.361   
average age  39.32    7.158   
percentage of male in the household  0.53    0.149   
percentage of students in the household  0.19    0.189   
off-farm employment percentage  0.16    0.194   
household size  4.07    1.255   
total income  20630.28    17314.770   
elementary school and below (reference)  0.11    0.308   
junior high school  0.52    0.500   
senior high school or professional school  0.32    0.467   
associate degree and above  0.05    0.222   
Banks in village  0.41    0.493   
have vehicles  0.79    0.410   
distance to closest banks  1.55    3.702   
income mainly from agriculture (reference)  0.65    0.477   
income mainly from non-agriculture  0.08    0.273   
income mainly from wage  0.25    0.430   
income from other resources  0.02    0.155   
have saving    0.52    0.500   
know about the small loan programs  0.68    0.468   
credit line if any by RCCs  0.29    0.455   
amount desired relative to income  0.18    0.882   
percentage of collateral required in bank loans  0.16    0.250   
percentage of required extra cost in bank loans  0.08    0.168   
bank loans preferred  0.37    0.484   
informal activities in village  0.73    2.202   
willing to take higher rate if emergency  0.29    0.455   
willing to take higher rate if getting more loans  0.65    0.478   
county-level population density    102.37    84.646   
county-level loan to saving ratio  1.27    4.518   




Table 2    Borrowing from Bank Loans Estimation Results and Marginal Effects 




Age      0.018  0.002   
  (0.035)  (0.004)   
Age
2  -0.0004  -0.00004   
  (0.0004)  (0.00005)   
Percentage of male in the household  0.225  0.027   
  (0.180)  (0.021)   
Percentage of students in the household  0.209  0.025   
  (0.165)  (0.020)   
Off-farm employment percentage  0.032  0.004   
  (0.226)  (0.027)   
Household size  0.039  0.005   
  (0.028)  (0.003)   
Total income  0.183*  0.022*   
  (0.095)  (0.011)   
Junior high school  -0.052  -0.006   
  (0.090)  (0.011)   
Senior high school or professional school  0.010  0.001   
  (0.110)  (0.013)   
Associate degree and above  0.117  0.014   
  (0.158)  (0.019)   
Banks in village  0.009  0.001   
  (0.126)  (0.015)   
Have vehicles  -0.099  -0.012   
  (0.095)  (0.011)   
Distance to closest banks  -0.0061  -0.001   
  (0.012)  (0.001)   
Income mainly from non-agriculture  0.164  0.020   
  (0.130)  (0.016)   
Income mainly from wage  -0.264***  -0.031***   
  (0.094)  (0.011)   
Income from other resources  -0.180  -0.021   
  (0.228)  (0.027)   
Have saving    -1.036***  -0.123***   
  (0.102)  (0.013)   
Know about the small loan programs  0.568***  0.068***   
  (0.112)  (0.013)   
Credit line if any by RCCs  1.293***  0.154***   
  (0.163)  (0.019)   
Amount desired relative to income  0.221***  0.026***   
  (0.084)  (0.010)   
Percentage of collateral required in bank loans  -0.070  -0.008   
  (0.291)  (0.035)   
Percentage of required extra cost in bank loans  0.783**  0.093***   
  (0.306)  (0.036)   
Informal interest  0.032  0.004   
  (0.022)  (0.003)   
Bank loans preferred  0.744***  0.089***   
  (0.104)  (0.013)   
County-level population density    -0.006***  -0.001***   
  (0.001)  (0.000)   
County-level loan to saving ratio  0.023***  0.003***   
  (0.005)  (0.001)   
County-level rural population percentage  -2.014**  -0.240**   
  (0.990)  (0.117)   
Province fixed effects      Yes   
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Table 3    Borrowing from Informal Credit Estimation Results and Marginal Effects 




age    0.133**  0.015**   
  (0.062)  (0.007)   
age square  -0.002**  -0.0002**   
  (0.0008)  (0.0001)   
percentage of male in the household  -0.151  -0.017   
  (0.297)  (0.033)   
percentage of students in the household  -0.375  -0.042   
  (0.246)  (0.028)   
off-farm employment percentage  -0.498  -0.056   
  (0.332)  (0.037)   
household size  0.033  0.004   
  (0.041)  (0.005)   
total income  0.086  0.010   
  (0.105)  (0.012)   
junior high school  0.102  0.011   
  (0.159)  (0.018)   
senior high school or professional school  -0.060  -0.007   
  (0.175)  (0.020)   
associate degree and above  0.062  0.007   
  (0.220)  (0.025)   
income mainly from non-agriculture  0.420**  0.047**   
  (0.179)  (0.020)   
income mainly from wage  -0.267**  -0.030**   
  (0.124)  (0.014)   
income from other resources  0.057  0.006   
  (0.313)  (0.035)   
amount desired  -0.007  -0.001   
  (0.030)  (0.003)   
informal credit available  0.535***  0.060   
  (0.157)  (0.017)   
county-level population density    -0.002  0.0002   
  (0.002)  (0.000)   
informal interest  0.168***  0.019***   
  (0.029)  (0.003)   
county-level rural population percentage  0.518  0.058   
  (0.821)  (0.092)   
county-level loan to saving ratio  0.021***  0.002***   
  (0.003)  (0.0003)   
willing to take higher rate if emergency  -0.729***  -0.082***   
  (0.239)  (0.027)   
willing to take higher rate if getting more loans  -0.514**  -0.058**   
  (0.234)  (0.027)   
Province fixed effects      Yes   
  Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *   
  Significant at 10% level. 